Home » The Bradley and How It Got That Way: Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army by W. Blair Haworth
The Bradley and How It Got That Way: Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army W. Blair Haworth

The Bradley and How It Got That Way: Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army

W. Blair Haworth

Published November 30th 1999
ISBN : 9780313030413
ebook
224 pages
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 About the Book 

The mechanized infantry is one of the least-studied components of the U.S. Armys combat arms, and its most visable piece of equipment, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, is one of the militarys most controversial pieces of equipment. This study tracesMoreThe mechanized infantry is one of the least-studied components of the U.S. Armys combat arms, and its most visable piece of equipment, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, is one of the militarys most controversial pieces of equipment. This study traces the idea of mechanized infantry from its roots in the early armored operations of World War I, through its fruition in World War II, to its drastic transformation in response to the threat of a nuclear, biological, and chemical battlefield. The U.S. Armys doctrinal migration from the idea of specialized armored infantry to that of more generalized mechanized infantry led to problematic consequences in training and equipping the force. Haworth explores the origins, conduct, and outcome of the Bradley controversy, along with its implications for Army institutional cultures, force designs, and doctrines.--Challenging traditional partisan views of the Bradley program, Haworth goes to the roots of the issue. The author details the mechanized infantrys problematic status in the Armys traditional division of roles and missions between its Infantry and Armored branches. While new conditions demand new equipment, old institutions and current commitments inevitably complicate matters- thus, traditional infantry considerations have driven the Bradleys requirements. The raw capability of the vehicle and the fortitude and ingenuity of its users have to some extent compensated for the conflicting pressures in its design. However, the reluctance of the Army to see mechanized infantry as a specialty has led to the problem the vehicle has faced, as this book clearly shows.